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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900418-CA
Priority No. 2

MIGUEL ENRIQUE SALAS-LEYVA,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Appellant's Statements of Jurisdiction, Issues and
Standards of Review, the Case, and the Facts are contained in
Appellant's opening brief at 1-9.

Appellant relies on those

statements and the arguments set forth in his opening brief and
makes the following replies.

Issues not addressed in this reply

brief are adequately addressed in Appellant's opening brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because Appellant was legally licensed to drive in Utah,
the stop of his vehicle violated the fourth amendment.

Nor did the

officer have a reasonable articulable suspicion based on the
informant's tip.

The State makes this alternative argument for the

first time on appeal.

It objected to developing the facts

surrounding such argument in the trial court, and the facts which
were developed do not amount to an objectively reasonable suspicion.
The pretext doctrine is well established and based on
important policy considerations.

The State has not offered a

convincing reason for this Court to overrule its own recent
precedent.

The detention in this case was an invalid pretext stop.

The scope of any detention is a necessary part of any
analysis as to the reasonableness of the detention.

Terry and its

progeny carved a limited exception to the warrant requirement where
the detention is based on reasonable articulable suspicion and the
intrusion is strictly limited to the purpose of the stop.

Appellant

preserved this issue for appeal.
Appellant did not voluntarily consent to the search of his
vehicle.
The State did not establish that officers did not exploit
the primary illegality.
Appellant properly marshalled and analyzed the evidence.
The evidence failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the
controlled substance and Appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE INITIAL DETENTION VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT.
A. THE OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE A VALID BASIS FOR THE
STOP.
(Reply to Point I.A of State's Brief)
Appellant's argument in Point I.A of his opening brief,
pages 11-16, is that because he was legally licensed to operate a
motor vehicle in Utah, the stop of his vehicle was not objectively
reasonable.
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The first aspect of this argument is that since individuals
can be licensed in other states and countries, the failure to locate
a Utah license for the driver does not create a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver has committed a traffic
violation.1
Appellant also argues that because he was, in fact, legally
licensed in Utah, the officer's erroneous belief that Appellant had
committed a traffic violation was not objectively reasonable.

The

cases cited by Appellant on page 15 of his brief, although not
directly on point, discuss situations where the information relied
upon by police officers was incorrect.

Appellant cited those cases

for the proposition that a detention violates the fourth amendment
where the officers rely on incorrect information in making the stop.
In the present case, the officer relied on information from
other police or state agencies in reaching his conclusion that
Appellant was not legally licensed to drive in Utah.

Detective

McCarthy claimed that he checked several possible names, including
the name under which Appellant was licensed.

Either Detective

McCarthy or the agencies made an error since Appellant was legally
licensed to drive.
reasonable.

Hence, the seizure was not objectively

See generally United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221

1. Appellant's reliance on State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah
1987), in his opening brief at 13-14 is meant to point out the
factual distinction between confirming that a Utah license has been
revoked and simply being unable to find a Utah license. It is not
meant to suggest a new standard for this Court. See State's brief
at 9.
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(1985).2
The State argues for the first time on appeal that the
officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion based on the
informants tip.

State's brief at 11-13.

The argument was not

raised below, nor was it factually developed in the trial court.
The prosecutor objected in the trial court when defense counsel
attempted to explore the information given by the informant to the
officers, and the officers claimed that they stopped the vehicle
because of a traffic violation and not based on the informant's
tip.

T. 1:11.

In addition, the facts in this case did not

establish a reasonable articulable suspicion.

See footnote 3 in

Appellant's opening brief at 12.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d

301 (1990), is distinguishable from the present case since the tip
in White contained greater detail and the actions of the defendant
corroborated more aspects of the tip than in the present case.

In

White, officers received an anonymous phone call, informing them
that (1) Vanessa White would be leaving a specific address at a
specific time in a particular car, (2) she would be going to Dobey's

2. In United States v. DeLeon-Reyna.
F.2d
(5th Cir.
April 17, 1991), 1991 WL 55881, cited by the State in a letter of
supplemental authority dated May 14, 1991, the Court did "not
question the good faith of the officers who made [the] stop," and
applied a good faith exception to a warrantless stop. In the
present case, the officer who made the stop was not acting in good
faith. Furthermore, although the fifth circuit applies a good faith
exception to warrantless arrests, such an application is not
accepted in other jurisdictions, including Utah. In State v.
Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 185 (Utah 1987), the supreme court recognized
that the good faith or "Leon exception, by its own terms, could
never apply to an investigatory stop and search."
- 4

Motel, and (3) she would be in possession of a brown attache case
which contained cocaine.

110 L.Ed.2d at 306-7.

A short time later, officers watched a woman leave the
designated apartment, enter the designated vehicle, and drive in the
most direct route to the motel.
short" of the motel.

Officers stopped the vehicle "just

Id.

Information that a woman would be leaving a specific
apartment at around 4:00 p.m. would be more difficult to obtain and
carry more weight when the activity actually occurred than
information that an individual would be leaving his place of work
during the lunch hour.

An individual would merely need to know

where Appellant worked in order to obtain that information in the
present case.

In addition, the tip did not provide officers with

information as to where Appellant was going.

Unlike the situation

in White, the route traveled by Appellant did not corroborate
information given in the tip.
State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990), also cited
by the State on page 12 of its brief in support of its argument that
the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify
stopping Appellant, involved a citizen informant.

In reaching its

decision, this Court recognized that "[C]ourts view the testimony of
citizen informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of
police informers.

[citation omitted]."

Id. at 284. Hence, Brown

is distinguishable from the present case.
Neither the informant's tip nor the officer's inability to
find a Utah driver's license, despite the fact that Appellant was
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legally licensed to drive in this state, created a reasonable
articulable suspicion which would justify the initial detention.

B. THE STOP OF THE VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC
VIOLATION WAS A PRETEXT TO SEARCH FOR DRUGS.
(Reply to Point I.B of State's Brief)
But for the officer's desire to search Appellant's vehicle,
they would not have run a check to determine whether Appellant was
legally licensed or have stopped Appellant's vehicle.

The initial

detention was therefore not objectively reasonable.
Although the State requests that this Court reject its
previously outlined pretext doctrine, it has not offered a
convincing reason for negating recent precedent.

As this Court

recognized in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-9 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), overruled on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684
(Utah 1990), the pretext doctrine reflects the responsibility of the
courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

This Court stated:

[I]t is impermissible for law enforcement
officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext
to search for evidence of a more serious crime.
The violation of a constitutional right by
subterfuge cannot be justified . . . were the use
of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for
searching people suspected of felonies to be
permitted, a mockery could be made of the Fourth
Amendment and its guarantees. The courts must be
vigilant to detect and prevent such a misuse of
legal processes.
754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Taglavore v. United
States, 291 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961).
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In Sierra, this Court also recognized the importance of the
pretext doctrine in light of the discretion generally afforded
police officers:
M,

[I]n most jurisdictions and for most traffic
offenses the determination of whether to issue a
citation or effect a full arrest is discretionary
with the officer,' and . . . 'very few drivers
can traverse any appreciable distance without
violating some traffic regulation,' this
[pretextual traffic stop] is indeed a frightening
possibility. It is apparent that virtually
everyone who ventures out onto the public streets
and highways may then, with little effort by the
police, be placed in a position where he is
subject to a full search. Nor is one put at ease
by what evidence exists as to police practices in
this regard; it is clear that this subterfuge is
employed as a means for searching for evidence on
the persons of suspects who could not be lawfully
arrested for the crimes of which they are
suspected."
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978-979, quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 5.2(e) (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted).
In State v. Holmes, 256 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1972), the court
explained that the pretext doctrine is also meant to protect equal
protection principles in law enforcement:
We conclude that at the bottom of the
pretextual arrest doctrine is an unarticulated
application of Yick Wo v. Hopkins [118 U.S. 356
(1886)]: "Though the law itself be fair on its
face, and impartial in appliance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution." This
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
suggests that the real evil of searches and
seizures incident to a traffic arrest is not that
the arrest is a pretext for the search, but that
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the arrest is one which would not have been made
but for the motive of the arresting officer.
Holmes, 256 So.2d at 34, quoting Yick Wo at 373-374.

See also

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988) (M[I]n
the absence of standardized police procedures that limit discretion,
whether we are simply allowed to continue on our way with a stern
look, or instead are stopped and subjected to lengthy and intrusive
interrogation when we forget to wear our seat belts, turns on no
more than 'the state of the digestion of any officer who stops us
or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our
automobiles, the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair
or the color of our skin.7

[Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth

Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 416 (1974).]").
The term "pretext" is defined by the court in State v.
Holmes, 256 So.2d 32 (Fla. App. Dist. 2 1972), as
"A purpose or motive alleged, or an appearance
assumed, in order to cloak the real intention or
state of affairs; excuse; pretense; cover;
semblance."
Id. at 34 n.8, quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of the
English Language, 2d ed. 1957.
Numerous courts have defined the pretext doctrine in search
and seizure cases.

See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d

1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) ("a pretextual stop occurs when the
police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search
a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated
serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion
necessary to support a stop."); United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d
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1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) ("By definition, a pretextual arrest
occurs when the police employ an arrest based on probable cause as a
devise to investigate or search for evidence of an unrelated offense
for which probable cause is lacking."); People v. Hollowav, 330
N.W.2d 405, 412 (Mich. 1982) ("'Pretext arrests' are arrests in
which the officer, although making an apparently lawful arrest, is
making the arrest to conduct a search for which there is no
independent probable cause.

The basic principle is simply that

'[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence,7
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76
L.Ed.2d 877 (1932)."); United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704, 710
(11th Cir. 1986) ("[W]hile Trooper Vogel's courtroom declaration of
motive is intriguing, what turns this case is the overwhelming
objective evidence that Vogel had no interest in investigating
possible drunk driving charges.").
In the present case, where the officer made a traffic stop
based on his desire to search for drugs, the stop and ultimate
search violated the fourth amendment.

C. THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION EXCEEDED THE
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION.
(Reply to Point I.C of State's Brief)
Without addressing the merits of Appellant's argument that
officers exceeded the scope of a traffic stop, the State argues only
that Appellant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
Appellant has consistently argued that the detention and
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subsequent search violated the fourth amendment.
2, 5.

T. May 23, 1990:

Analysis of any "level two" 3 detention by officers

necessarily requires an analysis of the reasonableness of the
initial stop along with an analysis of whether the scope was
reasonably limited to the purpose of the stop.

See Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v.
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 153 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8, 9-10 (Utah 1991).

In other words, the scope of any

permissible Terry stop is strictly limited by the purpose for the
stop and inextricably linked thereto.

Hence, a claim that a

particular detention violates the fourth amendment raises the issue
of whether the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion along
with the issue of whether the officer's actions were strictly tied
to the purpose of the stop.

Id.

In Terry, the Court stated:
This court has held in the past that a search
which is reasonable at its inception may violate
the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable
intensity and scope. [citations omitted]. The
scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and
justified by" the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible. [citations omitted].
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-19.

The Terry court carved a limited

exception which necessarily limited the scope of any intrusions.
Id. at 30-1.

3. In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-8 (Utah 1987), this Court
outlined three levels of encounters between police and citizens.
This case involves a level two encounter, which requires a
reasonable articulable suspicion in order to be valid under the
fourth amendment.
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In State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 13 (Utah 1991),
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that:
The analysis that emerges from Terry and its
progeny revolves around two closely interrelated
analytical components: first, the specific and
articulable facts that justified the action, and
second, the scope of the interference. [citation
omitted].
In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court blurred the two
components in holding that the detention of a passenger in a vehicle
for a warrants check violated the Fourth Amendment.
With the paucity of facts available to him, the
officer's detention of the passenger beyond what
was reasonably related in scope to the traffic
stop was not justified by a articulable suspicion
that defendant had committed a crime.
Johnson. 153 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10.
In Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135, the Utah Supreme Court
reemphasized the limited scope of a traffic stop.

The Court stated:

In Arizona v. Hicks. 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct.
1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that even a small intrusion beyond the
legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
774 P.2d at 1135.
Hence, the scope of the intrusion is necessarily linked to
the purpose of the detention; raising a claim that the detention
violated the fourth amendment raises a claim that the permissible
scope was exceeded.
Furthermore, Appellant discussed the scope of the
intrusion, albeit briefly, during argument.
Appellant stated:
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In opening, counsel for

However, we have raised the issues of the
reasonableness of the stop herein, whether or not
there was a pretense search; and given that
status, I believe it is the State's burden to
establish that reasonableness . . . .
T. 2.

In argument, counsel for Appellant stated:
The issue is not whether Officer McCarthy could
stop the vehicle. The issue is really would he
have made the seizure of Mr. Leyva, absent any
other kind of illegitimate [motivations]. And
the issue here is that he was looking for a
specific violation, but he could stop that car
and he could effectuate some kind of an arrest,
some kind of a citation [or] grievance to get
that car, and he has been quite clear about that
and I think quite honest. He suspected
narcotics. He wanted to search that car and he
was going to search that car.

T. 51.
Finally, the cases cited by the State at pages 18-9 do not
address the issue of whether an argument regarding the scope of an
intrusion is necessarily raised when the reasonableness of an
investigatory stop is attacked.
In all of the cases cited by the State, the appellant
raised a distinct legal argument which had not been raised below. 4

4. In State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-8 (Utah Ct. App.), rev'd
on other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. 8 (Utah 1991), the issue was whether
the appellant could raise a distinct state constitutional argument
for the first time on appeal. In State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252,
254 (Utah 1983), the appellant failed to object in the trial court
to some comments made by the court which the appellant then attacked
for the first time on appeal. In State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660
(Utah 1985), the appellant attacked the search of his backpack for
the first time on appeal; in the trial court, he had attacked only
the frisk of his person. In State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert,
denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981), the appellant did not argue in the
trial court that the seizure was illegal because the officer failed
to obtain a warrant. In State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App.
1990), the appellant raised for the first time on appeal an
(footnote continued)
- 12 -

By contrast, in the present case, the reasonableness of the
detention, which necessarily includes the issue of whehter the scope
of the detention was proper, was necessarily raised in the trial
court.

POINT II. APPELLANT DID NOT GIVE A VALID CONSENT
TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE.
(Reply to Point I.D of State's Brief)
A. APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE
SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE.
In State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
We further note that in considering the
lawfulness of the stop and the seizure and
search, the trial court should regard with
caution any claim that the suspect "consented."
The realities of interactions between private
citizens and the police are such that "consent"
is often merely a fiction, particularly when it
results from illegal police conduct. [citations
omitted].
In this case, the totality of the circumstances establish
that consent was not voluntarily given.

B. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE OFFICERS
DID NOT EXPLOIT THE PRIMARY ILLEGALITY.
Without addressing the merits of Appellants argument in
this subsection, the State claims simply that the initial detention

(footnote 4 continued)
argument that the officers failed to comply with statutory
requirements in executing a search warrant.
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was permissible, and that therefore this issue need not be addressed.
Two cases decided by this Court after Appellant filed his
opening brief, State v. Carter, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21 (Utah App.
1991), and State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 1991),
offer further guidance in analyzing whether the taint of the primary
illegality has been attenuated.

Both Sims and Carter support

Appellant's argument that the taint was not attenuated in this case.

POINT III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
CONVICT APPELLANT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
(Reply to Point II of State's Brief)
Contrary to the assertion of the State that Appellant has
failed to adequately marshal and analyze the evidence (State's Brief
at 22-3), Appellant has cited the testimonies of Officer McCarthy
and Agent Englin and has viewed the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict. 5

Appellant's position is that, where a

small amount of cocaine was found under the back seat of an
automobile where such back seat was occupied by an individual, there
was insufficient evidence to establish possession by Appellant
despite the fact that he owned the vehicle.
Pursuant to State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 318-9 (Utah 1985),
and State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986), the evidence

5. In his opening brief at 31-4, Appellant cited the same evidence
cited by the State at pages 23-4 of its brief as well as the
evidence argued by the State in closing. T. 2:82.
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in this case failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the
controlled substance and Appellant.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Salas-Leyva respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.
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